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NOTES
A NEW DIRECTION FOR IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION
INTRODUCTION

Since the Supreme Court first inferred a private right of action' from a federal
statute more than sixty years ago, 2 the lower federal courts have refined and
expanded upon the practice with increasing frequency. 3 Despite attempts by the
Court to develop appropriate guidelines 4 for resolving implication questions,
however, implied actions continue to present analytical problems for the federal
judiciary. 5 The current confusion regarding the proper analysis for inference of a
1. The phrase "private cause of action" was recently defined as "the right of a private party to
seek judicial relief from injuries caused by another's violation of a legal requirement. In the context of
legislation enacted by Congress, the legal requirement involved is a statutory duty." Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 n. 1 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). Such private rights of
action, judicially inferred from either regulatory or criminal statutes which do not explicitly provide
therefor, are also commonly referred to as "implied causes of action," see Note, Implying Civil
Remediesfrom FederalRegulatory Statutes, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 285, 285 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Implying Civil Remedies], and the concept of such judicial inference is commonly known as the
"implication doctrine." See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1072 n. 11 (7th Cir.
1976), rev'd, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Pillai, Negative Implication: The Demise of Private Rights of

Action in the FederalCourts, 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1978); Note, Implied PrivateActions Under
FederalStatutes-The Emergence ofa Conservative Doctrine, 18 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 429, 429-30
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Emergence ofa Conservative Doctrine].This Note's discussion of implied
actions is limited to statutory private causes of action, with a particular emphasis placed on implied
actions in the area of securities law. Private causes of action arising under the Constitution or its
amendments are omitted because the criteria used in the analysis of such actions are separate and
distinct from those that should be used when examining statutory private rights of action. See Davis
v. Passman, 99 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1979).
2. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 40 (1916). But see Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 732 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (the Rigsby Court used the term
"private right of action" to convey a different connotation from the one commonly used today). In
Rigsby, the Court found that "[a] disregard of the command of [a] statute is a wrongful act, and where
it results in damage to one of the class for whose especialbenefit the statute was enacted, the right to
recover the damages from the party in default is implied." 241 U.S. at 39 (emphasis added); accord,
Restatement of Torts § 286 (1934). This analytical approach to implication is often referred to as the
"statutory tort approach." See Note, Implication of PrivateActions from FederalStatutes: From
Borakto Ash, 1 J. Corp. L. 371, 376 (1976) [hereinafter cited asFrom Borakto Ash]. As courts began
to resort to the implication doctrine with increasing frequency, the deficiencies of the statutory tort
approach became apparent; its overly broad nature failed to establish any comprehensive standards
for judicial inference and it could easily be construed to apply to most statutes. Comment, Private
Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implicationsfor Implication, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1392, 1394 (1975) [hereinafter cited asPrivate Rights]. Although the statutory tort approach was not
abandoned completely, courts began to supplement the Rigsby tort doctrine with other analytical
criteria to justify the inference of a private right of action. See notes 81-89 infra and accompanying
text.
3. See Implying Civil Remedies, supra note 1, at 285; From Borak to Ash, supra note 2, at 371;
Private Rights, supra note 2, at 1396.
4. See notes 17-23 infra and accompanying text.

5. See Young, Supreme Court Report, 66 A.B.A.J. 88, 88 (1980); notes 23-27 infra and accompanying text-
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cause of action 6 arises in part from the haphazard development of the Supreme
in part from the Court's most recent trend
Court's implied action cases 7 and
8
toward discouraging their use.

Although the Court refused to acknowledge implied actions in some decisions

in the late 1950's, 9 its recognition in 1964 of a private cause of action under
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) 10 inJ.I.
Case Co. v. Borak'1 seemed to signal a renewed leniency toward implied
actions. 12 This liberal attitude was short-lived, however, and between 1974 and
1977 the Court made its first major effort to curtail the expansion of the implication doctrine. 13 In a series of decisions departing from the Borak approach, the
6. See notes 28-31 infra and accompanying text.
7. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 731 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 561 F.2d 1178,1184(5th Cir. 1977); cf. Note, EmergingStandardsforlhplied
Actions Under FederalStatutes, 9 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 295, 298-99 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Emerging Standards)(discussion of the lack of comprehensive standards in the federal courts for
inferring private causes of action prior to Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
8. See pt. I infra.
9. T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1959) (Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49
U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1976), did not provide a private cause of action to shipper who sought to challenge
reasonableness of motor carrier's past charges); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373,
375-76, 382 (1958) (no private cause ofaction under § 4 or § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26
(1976), for sales made at unreasonably low prices for the purposes of destroying competition). But see
Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 87-88 (1962) (implied cause of action
for damages allowed under Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1976), because Issue
was reasonableness of routes, not rates; T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959),
distinguished).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
11. 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964). The Borak Court relied on several rationales to justify Its
inference of a private right of action in favor of the plaintiff shareholder. The action was based on the
defendant corporation's issuance of an allegedly false and misleading proxy statement in connection
with a merger. The Court ruled that § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1976), which grants the appropriate district courts jurisdiction over "'all suits in equity and actions
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created' under the Act," gives private parties a right to
bring suit for violations of § 14(a), which does not expressly provide for any private actions. 377 U.S.
at 431. In so doing, the Court stressed the generally "broad remedial purposes" of § 14(a), the section's
chief purpose of investor protection, and the need for private enforcement of the proxy rules to
supplement actions taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Id. at 431-32. Borak
evidenced a shift away from a purely statutory tort approach to implication. See note 2 supra. Tile
Court emphasized the need for courts to approach implication problems mindful of their duty to
provide "such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose" in enacting the
statute in question. 377 U.S. at 433; see From Borak to Ash, supra note 2, at 379-80.
12. The Court apparently continued to favor a broad approach to implication through the late
1960's. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (violation of the
fourth amendment by federal agents gives rise to a private cause of action for damages); Wyandotte
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200 (1967) (remedies and procedures specified In Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467e (1976), were not intended to be exclusive; United
States can, therefore, bring suit to recover costs incurred in removing a negligently sunk barge,
although act does not provide for this remedy); cf. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (Court recognized that an implied action under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), is now well established).
13. See Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Pendulum Swings, 65 Geo. L.J., 891, 923 (1977); Pillai, supra note 1, at 2-3.
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Court sought not only to limit future use of the implication doctrine,' 4 but to
reduce the scope and effectiveness of previously recognized implied actions as

well. 15
The Court's unanimous decision in Cortv. Ash ' 6 most clearly enunciated this
new implied action conservatism. The adoption in Cort of a structured approach
to implication analysis, more than the precise holding of the case, attested to a
new caution in the area of implied actions. Drawing on the rationales and
approaches of prior implication cases, ' 7 the Court formulated four relevant
factors to be considered by a court addressing an implied action question:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,"
that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?. Second, is there any

indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to
deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? [Fourth], is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?'
Although the Cort implication criteria were formulated in the context of the

Supreme Court's analysis of a criminal statute,1 9 they have since been applied to
14. Redington v. Touche Ross& Co., 592 F.2d 617, 628(2d Cir. 1978) (Mulligan, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 99 S. CL 2479 (1979);see, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977) (finding
no private cause of action under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1976), in favor of defeated tender offeror); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1975) (no private cause of
action allowed against corporate directors for violation of criminal statute prohibiting election
contributions); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 420-22, 425 (1975)
(customers of failing broker-dealer did not have private cause of action under Securities Investor
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1976), to force Securities Investor Protection Corp. to
perform its duties); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 464-65 (1974) (statute provided exclusive remedy; no private cause of action allowed).
15. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (plaintiff asserting
private action under rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), must allege manipulative or
deceptive conduct); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976) (standard of
materiality adopted for rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1979), promulgated under § 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (plaintiff asserting private action under rule 10b-S must allege scienter) Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975) (person who is neither buyer nor
seller of securities cannot bring action under § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), or rule 10b-5).
16. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The issue in Cort was whether a corporate shareholder could bring a
derivative private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 610 against corporate directors who allegedly
made contributions and expenditures in connection with the 1972 presidential election. Section 610, a
criminal statute prohibiting the expenditure of corporate funds in connection with certain federal
elections, specifically provided that violators of the section were subject to fines andlor imprisonment, but did not expressly provide for any civil rights of action. The Court held that a private right
of action could not be judicially inferred under the section. 422 U.S. at 69.
17. E.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); Bivens v. Six Unknown
NamedAgents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Calhoonv. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964);J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.
33 (1916); see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
18. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted).
19. See note 16 supra.
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a variety of statutes that differ in nature, scope and purpose.2 0 Developed as
merely a suggested approach 21 to a complex problem of statutory construction
and the discernment of legislative intent, 22 the test has become the analytical
focal point for most courts deciding an implication issue.2 3 Frequent applications
of the loosely-structured and overlapping criteria, 24 however, have disclosed
their weakness as an analytical model and their susceptibility to judicial manipulation. 25 Moreover, the method of reconciling the often conflicting results produced by the factors 26 was not discussed in the Cort opinion. Consequently, the
20. See 3A H. Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Law § 9.05A (rev. 1979).
21. The four factors presented in Cori are merely dicta and, although deemed relevant by the
Supreme Court, are not compulsory tests to be used in analyzing every implied action problem. See
Sacks v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568
F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Emerging Standards, supra note 7, at
295. Compare Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (1979) (limited Cort analysis
applied) with Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (all four Cori factors
analyzed).
22. The Court has often characterized the question of the existence of an implied action as one of
statutory construction. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242,
245 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2485 (1979); cf. National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (Court employed statutory
construction theory in its implication analysis). Although a distinction has sometimes been drawn
between "statutory construction" and "statutory interpretation" on the ground that "interpretation"
refers to the meaning of words and "construction" to the application of words to the facts at issue, In
judicial practice the terms are used interchangeably. 2A J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 45.04 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973). Legislative intent is the traditional standard used In
the interpretation of statutes. id. While the concept of using legislative intent to decide questions
of statutory interpretation has provoked debate, id. § 45.06; MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75
Yale L.J. 754, 754 (1966), it continues to be favored by the courts over the meaning given to the
statute by "members of the public to whom it is addressed." 2A J. Sutherland, supra, § 45.08; see
note 147 infra and accompanying text.
23. Cf. Pillai, supra note 1, at 19 (Cort and criterion set forth in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977), constitute definitive rules for implication); Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine,
supra note 1, at 449 (Cort factors are to control implication decision).
24. See Crawford & Schneider, The Implied Private Cause of Action and the Federal Aviation
Act: A PracticalApplication ofCort v. Ash, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 657, 657 (1978). The interrelated nature
of the factors and the absence of any explanation in Cort as to the weight each one was to be given
caused new problems for the federal courts with respect to implied actions cases. See 4 A.
Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud § 2.4, at 384.3 (1979);
McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 Dick. L. Rev. 167, 187 (1975); Emerging Standards, supra note 7, at 316-18.
25. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 667, 740-41 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); see
Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223, 232 (7th Cir. 1978) (Bauer, J., dissenting) (court "adjusted" Cort
factors), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 3094 (1979); Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F. 2d 617, 628 (2d Cir.
1978) (Mulligan, J., dissenting) (majority "misapplied" Cort), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979); Crawford
& Schneider, supra note 24, at 658-59.
26. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (referring to situation when
all four Cort factors point to implication as "atypical"); Clark v. Gulf Oil Corp., 570 F.2d 1138,
1145-50 (3d Cir. 1977) (finding plaintiffs within especial class was insufficient to outweigh inconsistencies of implied action with legislative scheme; remaining factors provided little guidance on
issue), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 970 (1978); Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452, 460
(3d Cir. 1976) (concluding that plaintiff was not a member of an especial class and that the action
was a matter of state concern, court found it unnecessary to consider second and third factors;
implied action denied); National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 470 F. Supp.
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federal courts have felt free to select the factors to be applied to a particular
statute and have continued to infer private causes of action frequently,2 7 despite
the Supreme Court's original goal of limiting such practices through the Cort test.
Nowhere is the uncertainty as to the proper analysis for inferring private
causes of action as evident as in the Supreme Court decisions that have confronted the issue in the past year. 28 Although they evidence a certain consistency
of result, usually refusing to infer a cause of action, 29 they lack consistent
analysis. 30 This Note explores these recent decisions and in particular examines
their impact on the future of the implication doctrine in the context of federal
securities law, an area which has been the subject of a significant portion of
implied action litigation. 3 1 Using the securities laws as a conceptual model, the
Note also proposes a specialized approach for determining the existence of
private rights of action within a federal regulatory scheme.
I.

RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Although the Supreme Court has recently further limited the use of implied
32
actions, it has not altogether foreclosed the possibility of judicial inference.
Three of the Court's recent decisions, however, illustrate the substantial diver1256, 1259-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (concluding that the findings of an especial beneficiary and no state
law tradition were insufficient to outweigh the negative implication results produced by the
second and third factors; implied action denied).
27. See, e.g., Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617, 621-23 (2d Cir. 1978) (implied
cause of action recognized under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (a)
(1976)), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979); Local Div. No. 714, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater
Portland Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1, 12-16 (1st Cir. 1978) (implied cause of action recognized under
§ 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1976)); Bratton v.
Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223, 228-32 (7th Cir. 1978) (implied cause of action for travelers exists under
§ 1371(nX2) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(nX2) (1976)), vacated, 99 S. Ct.
3094 (1979) (remanded for further consideration in light of Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99
S. Ct. 2479 (1979)); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 872-76 (2d Cir. 1977) (implied cause
of action recognized under § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6
(1976)), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d
1223, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1977) (section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, IS U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1976), held to provide private parties with an implied cause of action), rev'd on other grounds,
439 U.S. 551 (1979).
28. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); see Young, supra note 5, at 88 (recent decisions cast doubt on
Cort as precedent); cf. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 99 S. Ct. 2361, 2366 n.5 (1979)
(Court disposed of case on the merits; implied action issue not addressed); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S.
471, 476 n.5 (1979) (Court assumed, without deciding, that implied actions existed under the
statutesin question); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551,557 n.9 (1979) (same).
29. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 249 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 316-17 (1979). Contra, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
30. See pt. I infa.
31. See McMahon & Rodos, supranote 24, at 167 n. 13; Implying CivilRemedies, supra note 1,at
286.
32. Cf. Steinberg, Implied PrivateRights ofAction UnderFederalLaw, 55 Notre Dame Law. 33,
44 (1979) (discussing implication doctrine after Court's decision in Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979)). But see N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1979, § D, at 1, col. 4, at 17,
col. 3.
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sity of opinion among the Supreme Court Justices on the subject of implied

actions 33 and the need for refinement 34of the guidelines used to determine whether
inference of an action is justified.
A.

Cannon v. University of Chicago

Using a full Cort analysis, the Supreme Court held in Cannon v. University of
Chicago35 that section 901(a) of Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of
197236 confers an implied right of action on victims of sex discrimination in
federally financed educational programs.37 Although another section of Title IX
establishes an administrative procedure for termination of federal support to
institutions that discriminate on the basis of sex, 38 the Supreme Court rejected
the argument that Congress intended this express procedure to be the exclusive
means of enforcement. 9 The Court's reluctance to accept such an argument is
consistent with its pre-Cort decisions in NationalRailroad PassengerCorp. v.
NationalAssociation ofRailroadPassengers(Amtrak) 40 and Securities Investor
ProtectionCorp. v. Barbour(SIPC).4' In Amtrak and SIPC, the Court found
33. See Young, supra note 5, at 88. But see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), The
Chrysler Court faced implied action questions under both the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1976), and the Trade Secrets Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). Chrysler sought to establish
private rights of action under these acts to prevent disclosure of employment information it had
supplied to the Defense Logistics Agency. 441 U.S. at 286-37. A unanimous Court found the FOIA to
be exclusively a disclosure statute that did not afford those submitting information any right to enjoin
agency disclosure to third parties. Id. at 292, 294. The Supreme Court relied on Cort to establish that
the Trade Secrets Act, a criminal statute, did not warrant the inference of a private right of action. Id.
at 316. The Court's unanimity of opinion in Chrysler is attributable to the FOIA's relatively clear
legislative history, which seemed to preclude the need to resort to a detailed Cort analysis, and to the
criminal nature of the Trade Secrets Act. Id. at 316. In comparison, the regulatory statutes and
legislative histories at issue in the other 1979 implied action cases differ in nature and organization.
34. See notes 135-37 infra and accompanying text.
35.

441 U.S. 677 (1979).

36. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). Section 901(a) provides that no person "shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
37. 441 U.S. at 717. Cannon alleged that her applications for admission to medical school
were denied on the basis of sex. Id. at 680.
38. Section 902 provides for termination of federal financial assistance to recipient institutions
that have failed to comply with the provisions of § 90)1. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
39. 441 U.S. at 711. This argument is based on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterus
(expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). For a discussion of traditional applications
of this maxim of statutory construction, see 2A J. Sutherland, supra note 22, §§ 47.23-.25. The use
of this theory in the context of implied action analysis has met with strong criticism from commentators. See, e.g., Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine, supra note 1, at 452-53 (maxim limits a
court's inquiry to merely an examination of statutory language); Implying CivilRemedies, supranote
1, at 290 (although maxim may present one possible reading of a provision, other interpretations are
often plausible); cf. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 n.8 (1943) (maxim should
be merely another aid to statutory construction).
40. 414 U.S. 453 (1974). Amtrak used the exclusivity argument of statutory construction to hold
that the remedies specifically provided in § 307(a) of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45
U.S.C. § 547 (1976), were the exclusive means of enforcing that act. 414 U.S. at 464-65; see From
Borak to Ash, supra note 2, at 381.
41. 421 U.S. 412 (1975). The SIPC Court held that customers of a failing broker-dealer did not

1980]

IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION

that an "express statutory provision for one form of proceeding ordinarily implies

that no other means of enforcement was intended by the Legislature.1 42 This
conclusion will yield, however, when there is "clear contrary evidence of legislative intent"43 to imply a right of action. Evidently, the strict adherence to the
Cort criteria in the Cannon analysis of Title IX" produced sufficiently convincing evidence of a congressional private right of action intent to4Swarrant inference
despite the existence of express enforcement procedures.
Cannon'simpact on implied action analysis was twofold. First, the especial
benefit factor of Cort, labelled the "threshold question" by the Cannon majority, 46 seemed to emerge as the factor to be accorded primary importance in any
implied action analysis. The Cannon Court also suggested that consideration of
the especial benefit criterion should be based on the language of the statute itself,
'47
language which "expressly identifies the class Congress intended to benefit.
Unfortunately, because of its conclusion that each of the four factors supported
recognition of an implied action, the Court circumvented the need to balance the
conflicting results so often produced by the Cort criteria. 48
have a private right of action under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §
78aaa-78111 (1976), to compel the Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC) to perform its
statutory functions. 421 U.S. at 425. The Court found that the SEC's authority under § 7(b) of the act
to compel the corporation to perform its duties, see 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (1976), was the exclusive
means by which SIPC could be forced to act. See 421 U.S. at 417-18, 421.
42. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. at 419; see National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. at 461.
43. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. at 419 (quoting National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. at 458).
44. With respect to the four factors, the Court found that: (1) § 901 was enacted for the benefit of
persons discriminated against because of sex and that the plaintiff was a member of that class, 441
U.S. at 693-94; (2) the legislative history ofTitle IX plainly evidenced a congressional intent to create a
private remedy, id. at 694; (3) the inference of a private action would not frustrate the underlying
purpose of the legislative scheme, id. at 704-06; and (4) the subject matter of the suit, discrimination,
was not an area basically of concern to the states, but was in fact an area in which the federal
government and courts had been a primary force. Id. at 708-09.
45. The Cort criteria themselves do not contain any specific reference to the theory of statutory
construction followed in Amtrak and SIPC, although the maxim used in those cases, see notes 39-43
supra and accompanying text, has been incorporated by some courts into their discussion of the Car
factors. See, e.g., Caceres Agency, Inc. v. Trans World Airways, Inc., 594 F.2d 932, 933 (2d Cir.
1979); Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 588 F.2d 1216, 1223
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 49 (1979); Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223, 233 (7th Cir. 1978)
(Bauer, J.,dissenting), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 3094 (1979). The Cart and Cannon opinions both
reiterate the need for additional, convincing evidence beyond the mere existence of an express
remedy for this maxim'to be applied validly. See 441 U.S. at 711; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82
n.14 (1975). It has been argued that Cort's brief discussion of this maxim was directed at limiting
its use to the particular facts of Amtrak and SIPC. See Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine,
supra note 1, at 451-52; cf. Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d at 229-30 (Amtrak maxim does not
detract from duty to consider effectuation of congressional purpose). The Supreme Court's
increasingly strict approach to implication, however, is likely to result in the more frequent use of
this statutory construction principle. See pt. I(c) infra.
46. 441 U.S. at 689.
47. Id. at 690; see id. n.13.
48. Id. at 709. The consistent results of the factors as applied in Cannon were atypical. Id. at
717; see note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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Second, although the four factor Cort method received the general approval of
the Cannon majority, 49 the Justices questioned the basic premise of inferring
private causes of action."0 The majority noted that only in certain limited
circumstances, which it failed to delineate, will congressional failure to provide an
express civil remedy be consistent with a congressional intent "to have such a
remedy available to the persons benefited by its legislation. "S1 Both concurring 2
and dissenting 53 opinions echoed this readiness to substantially curtail future
inferences of private actions.
Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Cannon focused directly on the
changes in the Court's approach to implied action analysis since J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak.5 4 In Justice Rehnquist's view, Borak and its progeny 5 apparently gave
Congress the impression that the federal judiciary was willing to assume the task
of deciding whether a particular statute should support a private right of action. 5 6 Although Justice Rehnquist would not have the federal courts shoulder
this burden, 57 his opinion failed to explain whether Congress' duty to accept it
applies solely to prospective legislation or also to existing statutes. The former
interpretation seems preferable in light of the judiciary's established role in the
interpretation of legislative enactments. 58 The resolution of an implied action
49. See 441 U.S. at 688.
50. The Justices split into several factions in Cannon, each stressing different approaches or areas
of emphasis with regard to the interpretation of § 901. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, was
joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Rehnquist in holding that a private action
should be inferred. Id. at 680-717. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment. Id, Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stewart, filed a concurring opinion discussing the implication
doctrine generally. Id.; see notes 54-57 infra and accompanying text. Justice White's dissent, in
which Justice Blackmun joined, attacked the majority's reading of both Title IX and the
legislative history of that act, but did not challenge the Court's overall approach to implied
actions. See 441 U.S. at 718-30. In contrast, Justice Powell's separate dissent offered an entirely
different approach to implication issues. Id. at 730-49; see notes 60-64 infra and accompanying
text.
51. 441 U.S. at 717. Discussing the second Cort factor, however, the Court noted that "it Is
not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit
purpose to deny such cause of action would be controlling." Id. at 694 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 82 (1975)).
52. 441 U.S. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see notes 54-57 infra and accompanying
text.
53. 441 U.S. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting); see notes 60-64 infra and accompanying text.
54. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See also notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617, 623 (2d Cir. 1978) (applyingBorak
"necessity" rationale to justify implication), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979); Abrahamson v. Fleschner,
568 F.2d 862, 872 (2d Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). Compare Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25, 32-33, 41 (1977) (distinguishingBorak as to both the type of
plaintiff and the need to ensure fulfillment of the act's purposes) with id. at 59-61, 66 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (applying Borak rationales; Cort distinguished).
56. 441 U.S. at 718.
57. Id. While many of the Justices comprising the Cannon majority might agree with Justice
Rehnquist that there has been a conservative shift in the Court's attitude towards implied actions, it Is
doubtful that all would go along with Justice Rehnquist in favoring a continuation of this narrowing
process. See id.; Young, supra note 5, at 88.
58. See 2A J. Sutherland, supranote 22, § 45.04; accord, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 253 n.8 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Steinberg, supra note 32, at 51; cf.
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question under existing statutes should require congressional action only when
judicial inference would exceed the bounds of interpretation and border on
judicial legislation.5 9 Thus, the development and refinement of sound guidelines
to aid in the interpretation of existing statutes should be stressed rather than the
elimination of judicial action altogether.
To restrain courts that too readily create private rights of action and to
encourage legislative resolution of policy considerations inherent in implied
actions,6" Justice Powell, in a dissenting opinion, recommended replacing the
Cort criteria with a stricter test that would require "the most compelling evidence" of congressional intent. 6 ' Although a compelling evidence test might be
easier to administer, it provides too narrow and inflexible an alternative to the
Cort approach. 62 A compelling evidence requirement would eliminate a court's
ability to consider the subtler influences of factors such as congressional awareness of judicial precedent 63 and might reduce any inherent flexibility that Con64
gress sought to provide in the statute.
From Borak to Ash, supra note 2, at 373-74 (implication is a product of the "inherent limitations" of
the legislative process).
59. The development and expansion of judicial inference of private actions, often criticized as
judicial legislation and a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, see Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); From Borak to Ash, supra note 2, at
374, is attributable to "the inherent limitations of Congress and the law-making process." Id. at 373
(footnote omitted). For a general discussion of the separation of powers doctrine in the context of
statutory construction questions, see 1 J. Sutherland, supra note 22, §§ 3.01-.07, 3.26.
60. 441 U.S. at 749; accord, Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
Colum. L. Rev. 527, 545 (1947). According to Justice Frankfurter, courts are not equipped to devise
policy and, therefore, "[tlhe pressure on legislatures to discharge their responsibilities with care...
should be stiffened, not relaxed." Id.
61. 441 U.S. at 749. Justice Powell further advocated strict adherence to the Amtrak maxim so
that alternative enforcement mechanisms expressly provided in the statute would almost always
exclude the inference of private actions. Id; see notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
62. Convinced that the Cort approach allows the judiciary to assume the "policynmaking
authority" which the Constitution vested in Congress, id. at 743, Justice Powell developed a test
more in accord with a traditional and narrow view of the separation of powers principle. See
generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 126-27 (1978); 1J.
Sutherland, supra note 22, §§ 3.03-.07. Implication questions may require a court to draw a fine line
between "merely carrying out a [legislative] formulated policy" and "initiating policy." Cf.
Frankfurter, supra note 60, at 534 (discussing statutory interpretation generally). Justice Powell's
test, in flatly rejecting flexible guidelines, also eliminates the need for any in depth judicial investigation of the implied action issue. Although his response to the deficiencies of the Cart criteria is an
extreme one, his recognition of the need for a fresh approach to implication is valid. See 441 U.S. at
749; notes 135-38 infra and accompanying text.
63. The persuasiveness of this factor is evident in the majority opinion in Cannon. The Cannon
Court recognized that at the time of enactment of Title IX, Congress was aware of judicial precedent
allowing a private cause of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976), the statute upon which Title IX was patterned. 441 U.S. at 694-703.
The Court concluded that Congress had understood Title VI as permitting implied actions and
had intended that similar relief be available under Title IX. Id. at 703. See also 2A J.
Sutherland, supra note 22, § 49.02.
64. Cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ("efficient regulation of securities
trading could not be accomplished under a rigid statutory program"). See also Steinberg, supra note
32, at 40 (Justice Powell's test "premised on unduly strict notions of judicial restraint").
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Aside from its new focus on the especial benefit criterion as a primary factor,
the Cannon decision provides little additional guidance to aid a court in the
integration and evaluation of the Cort criteria. In fact, the opinions indicate that
the use of the Cort factors for analysis of implied actions is no longer unanimously
supported by the members of the Court.
B. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington
One month after Cannon, in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,65 the Supreme
Court considered its most important implication case arising under the securities
laws 66 since its 197 7 decision in Piperv. Chris-CraftIndustries, Inc. 67 In Piper,
the Court held that section 14(e) of the Exchange Act 68 did not provide a private
cause of action to a defeated tender offeror. 69 Although the Piper Court applied
the Cort test to section 14(e), 7 0 it did not discuss the implication issue strictly in
Cort terms. 71 The Court also focused on the absence of a need for an implied
65. 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979). Touche Ross, an accounting firm, was retained by Weis Securities, Inc.
to serve as that brokerage firm's independent auditor. In addition to conducting audits, Touche Ross
prepared annual reports of Weis' financial position for filing with the SEC. Weis' subsequent
insolvency resulted in the appointment of Redington to act as trustee in Weis' liquidation under
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1976). The trustee and
the Securities Investor Protection Corp. sued Touche Ross for losses suffered by Wels' customers
as a result of the accounting firm's alleged improper audits and financial statement certifications.
Id. at 2482-84.
66. The Redington action was brought under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976). The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that no private right
of action was implicit in § 17(a). Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 428 F. Supp. 483, 489-91
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 592 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1978),rev'd, 99S. Ct. 2479(1979). The Second Circuit
reversed, finding that § 17(a) imposes a duty on accountants and that a breach of such duty gives rise
to an implied damage action in favor of a broker-dealer's customers. Redington v. Touche Ross &
Co., 592 F.2d 617, 621 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979).
67. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e), an antifraud provision, provides that "[flt shall be
unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material
fact" with respect to tender offers.
69. 430 U.S. at 42.
70. The Cort method led the Court to conclude that (1) the plaintiff was not one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, id. at 37; (2) although there was no express Intent
to deny a private damage remedy apparent in the legislative history, the history evidenced a
generally narrow purpose behind the enactment-the regulation of tender offerors, id. at 38; (3)
an implied action seeking damages was not consistent with the legislative scheme, id. at 39; and
(4) it was appropriate to relegate tender offerors to state law remedies. Id. at 41.
71. The Court at times seemed to treat the issue in Piper as one of standing, although the
predominant language in the opinion relates to the existence of an implied action. See 4 A.
Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 24, § 2.4, at 384.5. The Court began its analysis with an
examination of the statute itself and the legislative history of the Williams Act, which added §
14(e) to the Exchange Act in 1968. Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976)). The Williams Act was adopted "in response to the growing
use of cash tender offers as a means for achieving corporate takeovers." 430 U.S. at 22 (footnote
omitted). From this limited analysis, the Court concluded "that the sole purpose of the Williams
Act was the protection of investors who are confronted with a tender offer" and that Congress did
not contemplate a private cause of action for damages by a contending offeror against either the
target corporation oi competing offerors. Id. at 35 (emphasis added). The Court then used tile
Cort factors to confirm its conclusions as to § 14(e)'s legislative history. Finally, the Court
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action to effectuate congressional purposes. 72 Redington's significance as an
implication case lies not in its interpretation of section 17(a) of the Exchange
Act, 7 3 but in its express recognition of a threshold requirement which must be
met to justify a full Cort analysis. 74 Moreover, Redington conclusively rejected
prior, more expansive rationales which had been used to justify the inference of
75
private causes of action.
The Redington Court's approach to the implied action claim under section
17(a) represented a compromise between a full Cort analysis and the compelling
evidence test suggested by Justice Powell in Cannon. Redinglon advocated a
"limited" Cort analysis in certain prescribed instances. When a "statute by its
terms grants no private rights to [an] identifiable class [nor] proscribes [any]
conduct as unlawful" and when the "legislative history of the [statute] simply
does not speak to the issue of private remedies, ' 76 inquiry should end; no other
77
factors need be considered and the private right of action should be denied.
Apparently, no other factors can produce the degree of sufficiently compelling
evidence necessary to override these negative findings. According to the Redington Court, section 17(a) neither expressly confers any rights on private
parties nor does it proscribe unlawful conduct. 78 In addition, the section's
legislative history is silent on the issue of private actions. 7 9 The Court, therefore,
refused to recognize any private right of action under section 17(a). 80
In analyzing section 17(a), the Redington Court considered and rejected
several implication theories used extensively in the past to interpret securities
statutes. The oldest of these, the "tort doctrine," which held that an action was to
be inferred whenever disregard of a statute was a wrongful act and resulted in
damage to a party benefited by the statute,"' was dismissed-by the Court as
employed a policy argument reminiscent of reasoning used in Borak, but in this instance found
that a private cause of action was not necessary to effectuate Congress' purposes in enacting §
14(e). Id. at 41; cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (private enforcement
necessary to supplement SEC action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)). See generally notes 88-90 infra and accompanying text. For a further
discussion of the Piper litigation, see 91 Harv. L. Rev. 274 (1977); 3 J. Corp. L. 364 (1978).
72. 430 U.S. at 25, 41.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976). Section 17(a) was described by the Court as a "forward-looking"
statute, designed simply to aid the SEC in its monitoring of the financial condition of brokerage firms
and to prevent broker-dealer insolvency. The Court also classified § 17(a) as a reporting statute,
similar to countless other recordkeeping requirements found in regulatory statutes. 99 S. Ct. at
2486. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide whether § 18(a), which provides a
private cause of action to purchasers and sellers acting in reliance on a misleading statement, see
15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976), provides the exclusive remedy for misstatements in § 17(a) reports.
Because the plaintiffs did not meet § 18(a)'s purchaser-seller requirement, the Court was
"extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action in § 17(a) that is significantly broader than the
[express] remedy that Congress chose to provide" in § 18(a). Id. at 2488.
74. See 99 S. Ct. at 2489.
75. See notes 81-89 infra and accompanying text.
76. 99 S. Ct. at 2489.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2486.
79.

80.
81.
text.

Id.

Id. at 2487.
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 40 (1916, see note 2 supra and accompanying
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"entirely misplaced. '8 2 The Court also rejected the argument that the jurisdictional section of the Exchange Act,8 3 relied on to justify implication in Borak,
could by "its own force and effect" create a right of action,1 4 despite its reference
to "all suits in equity and actions at law" arising under the act. 85 Finally, the
Redington Court disapproved of the theory that a statute can support an implied
action because of its remedial nature.8 6 According to the Court, reliance on an
often vague remedial purpose does not provide any substantial basis for judicial
language, history
inference of a private action. Rather, it is the specific8statutory
7
and scheme that must dictate a court's decision.
Although not specifically rejecting the theory, the Redington Court found
irrelevant to its "central inquiry" into congressional intent the argument that a
private action should be inferred if such action is "necessary to 'effectuate the
purpose"' of a statute. 88 The Court, however, failed to explain when this
"necessity" argument may be appropriate. The Court might have done so by
distinguishing Piper, in which it used the finding of a lack of such a need to
justify its denial of an implied action. 8 9 To the extent, therefore, that Piper
considered the necessity of an action to be equally as important as the Cort
criteria, 90 Piper's analytical approach would seem to be overshadowed by
Redington.
82. 99 S. Ct. at 2485.
83. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
84. 99 S. Ct. at 2490. Instead, the Court ruled that "[t]he source of plaintiffs' rights must be
found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of the 1934 Act which they seek to enforce." Id.
85. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(1976) (emphasis added). Rejection
of this jurisdictional section argument reduces even further the courts' implied action flexibility. Such
sections, however, may still be useful in the context of tcourt's overall analysis of the legislative
scheme of an act and the type of relief available if an implied action is established. See notes 119-22
infra and accompanying text.
86. 99 S. Ct. at 2490; see, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964); Wilson v. First
Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated, 100 S. Ct. 442 (1979). The
danger in such reasoning is that it can result in an overly broad reading of a provision and lead to
judicial legislation, rather than judicial inference, of a private right of action. See 99 S. Ct. at
2490; cf. Pitt, An SEC Insider's View of the Utility of Private Litigation Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 5 Sec. Reg. L.J. 3, 4 (1977) (remedial "rhetoric" of some Supreme Court cases
eventually became a clichi).
87. See 99 S. Ct. at 2489.
88. Id.
89. 430 U.S. at 25-61, 41. Since the Supreme Court's broad use of this concept in JI. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), courts have frequently included it within a discussion of the third
Cort factor-legislative scheme. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316-17 (1979);
Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 561 F.2d 1178, 1189(5th Cir. 1977); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862,
875-76 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). The "necessity" concept Is not technically
part ofthe third Cort factor and when used as such can be nisleading. Only if the necessity for private
action was evident and recognized at the time of enactment or amendment will this line of inquiry be
helpful. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 199-200 (1963); notes 155,
165-67, 174 infra and accompanying text. Inferring a cause of action based on a recently developed or
increased need for supplementary enforcement can lead to judicial legislation and frustration of
congressional intent. See Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617, 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1978)
(Mulligan, J., dissenting), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979).
90. Cf. Pillal, supra note 1, at 35-36 (Cartfactors subordinated in Piper to an overriding and
dispositive test of necessity). Professor Pillai distinguished the necessity test used in Piperfrom that
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The relevance of the Borak opinion to future implication decisions is also
questionable in light of Cannon and Redington. Although the Court endeavored
to distinguish Borak in these cases, 9 1 it simultaneously undermined most of the
implication theories that formed the basis of the Borak decision. 92 After Redington, only the "necessity" argument of Borak retains any validity, yet it
remains the subject of confusion. 93 While acquiescing in the existence of the
particular cause of action recognized in Borak, 94 the Court has virtually eliminated the case's precedential value.
The Redington Court's implied action approach should eliminate the inference
of private actions from reporting provisions similar to section 17(a). 9s Many
other statutes, however, will probably be able to meet the new especial benefit or
prohibitory conduct requirement advocated in Redington.96 Unfortunately, the
facts inRedingtondid not provide the Court with an opportunity to elaborate
on
97
the further analysis that is needed when this requirement is met.
applied in Borak. "[The new necessity test tacitly presumes that no remedy is implied [; therefore,]
[t]he burden [is] now ... on the proponent of the remedy to show not merely that enforcement without
the remedy would be less effective, but that the denial of the remedy would cause the collapse of the
entire legislative scheme." Id. at 36 (footnote omitted). See also Pitt, supra note 86, at 11 (private
litigation no longer seems to be a necessary supplement to SEC action and "may not even seem
desirable to the Court in the long run').
91. See 99 S. Ct. at 2489-90 (Court declined to read Borak broadly); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n. 13 (1979) (Borak is a deviation from the Court's pattern of implied
action cases).
92.

See note 11 supra and accompanying text.

93. See 99 S. CL at 2489-90; notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
94. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979) (the private action for
damages recognized under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976), in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) was a
result of the Court's acquiesence in 25 years of acceptance by the lower courts of such an action).
95. See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1979) (questioning whether
§ 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976), requiring certain
reports to be filed with the SEC by issuers of registered securities, can give rise to an implied
cause of action in light of Redington).
96. See generally 3 H. Bloomenthal, supra note 20, § 1.16 (summary of disclosure and
reporting requirements under securities laws).
97. See also Steinberg, supra note 32, at 41-44. Professor Steinberg's article, written prior to the
decision in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979), adopts the
Redington implication approach and takes it one step further by outlining the additional factors
to be considered in the event the Redington "minimum requirement" is met. Steinberg, supra note
32, at 47. Designed to be applied in cases in which a federal statutes legislative history is silent or
ambiguous on the implication issue, Prof. Steinberg's "modified Cort test" requires not only that a
statute either grant certain rights to the plaintiff or proscribe unlawful conduct, Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 99 S. CL 2479, 2489 (1979), but that the third and fourth Cort factors also be
found to favor implication. Steinberg, supra note 32, at 50. In effect, Prof. Steinberg has
converted the Cort guidelines into mandatory tests, all of which must be met for implication to be
justified. See id. Although this new approach may appear to be consistent with the Court's
restrictive analysis of the Redington implication issue, see notes 76-80 supra and accompanying
text, it is not supported by the Court's decision in Lewis. While the statute in Lewis met the
Redington minimum requirement, see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S.
Ct. 242, 249 (1979), the Court refused to consider the "utility of a private remedy" and state law
traditions in its analysis of the issue. Id. at 249.
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Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis

In TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 98 the most recent implica-

tion case, a divided Court9 9 acknowledged the existence of a "limited private
remedy"100 under section 215 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the
Advisers Act). 101 The section 215 action allows an injured investor to void an
investment advisory contract, but precludes him from obtaining an award of
damages from violators of the Advisers Act. 10 2 In its analysis of the Advisers Act,
however, the Court mixed and manipulated prior implication concepts to
achieve an outcome consistent with the conservative implied action trend.
Consequently, the majority opinion did little to illuminate the modified method
of analysis used in Redington and further undermined the validity of a full Cort
analysis.
98. 100 S.Ct. 242 (1979). Lewis, a shareholder in a real estate investment trust, brought this suit
as a derivative action on behalf of the trust and as a class action on behalf of the trust's
shareholders, alleging various frauds and breaches of fiduciary duty by the trust's investment
adviser, the trust itself, individual trustees and two affiliated corporations, in violation of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.-§§ 80b-1 to -18a (1976). 100 S. Ct. at 243-44.
99. The split among the Justices on this particular implication issue is attributable to tile
existence of persuasive precedents allowing private causes of action for damages under antifraud
provisions similar to the provision under consideration in Lewis. See note 104 itbfra
and accompanying text. The Court, therefore, faced the difficult task of reconciling these precedents with its present
conservative stand on implied actions. Unfortunately, no attempt at reconciliation was actually
made in the majority opinion. See 100 S. Ct. at 250 (White, J., dissenting).
100. 100 S. Ct. at 249. The dissent in Lewis objected to the concept of a "limited private remedy,"
arguing that the majority had confused the existence of a right of action with the question of available
relief. Id. at 252. Although the Court recently acknowledged that an implied action inquiry is
analytically distinct from and should precede an inquiry into the availability of relief, Davis v.
Passman, 99 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1979), the Lewis majority apparently considered both questions
simultaneously in the context of its general inquiry into legislative intent. See 100 S. Ct. at 245-46.
Such a combined inquiry is not uncommon. See, e.g., Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 879
(2d Cir. 1977) (Gurfein, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). Nor is this the first time a
"limited" implied action has been recognized. See Kipperman v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 554 F.2d
377,380(9th Cir. 1977), in which the court held that an implied right of action under a statute making
mailing of unsolicited merchandise a per se unfair trade practice encompassed suits to secure
restitutionary relief, but did not include injunctive relief, as that would interfere with the Federal
Trade Commission's express statutory powers of enforcement.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 30b-15 (1976). The Advisers Act "was tile
last in a series of [regulatory statutes]
designed to eliminate various abuses in the securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). Congressional recognition of the importance of the
investment adviser's role in the securities industry prompted the development of legislation
designed to combat some of the problems and abuses prevalent among investment advisers. See
15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1976); S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 21-22 (1940). The theme of
investor protection is found throughout the Advisers Act's legislative history. See, e.g., S. Rep.
No. 910, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1976); S. Rep. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in
[1960] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3502; S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 21-22 (1940).
Until 1960, when the SEC obtained more substantial regulatory and administrative power over
investment advisers, see note 167 infra, the Advisers Act operated merely as a census of
investment advisers. See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 879 (2d Cir. 1977) (Gurfein,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1393, 1404-06
(2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969).
102. 100 S. Ct. at 249.
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Prior to Lewis, the circuit courts which considered the question of private
actions for damages under the Advisers Act 10 3 examined the issue in the context
of section 206 of the act, a broad antifraud provision that expressly forbids any
fraudulent or deceptive conduct by investment advisers. 10 4 Utilizing the Core
method of analysis, each of these courts, including the Ninth Circuit in Lewis,
concluded that a private action for damages should be inferred under section
10 6
It
206.10- The Supreme Court, however, refused to make this inference.
premised its denial on the selective use of the restrictive implication concepts
10 9
This approach seems to be an
found inAmtrak, 107 Cannon,10 8 andRedington
inadequate substitute for the detailed, comprehensive analysis that the section
206 implication question required. 110
103.

See Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part, re,'d in part

sub nom. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. CL 242 (1979); Wilson v. First
Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated, 100 S. Ct. 442 (1979) (remanded for
further consideration in light of Lewis); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). Section 206 prohibits investment advisers from (1) employing
"any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client;" (2) engaging in
transactions or practices designed to operate as a fraud upon such persons; and (3) engaging "in
any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." Id.
Implied actions for damages have been recognized under other antifraud provisions similar in
language to § 206, making recourse to that section of the Advisers Act logical for injured clients of
investment advisers. Note, Private Causes of Action Under Section 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 308, 311 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Private Actions]. Both § 206
and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1979), were patterned after § 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). See 100 S. Ct. at 250 n.1 (White, J., dissenting); 1 A. Bromberg
& L. Lowenfels, supra note 24, § 2.2 (410-20); 3 L. Loss, supra note 101, at 1515. Several federal
courts have found § 17(a) of the Securities Act to encompass a private right of action for damages.
See, e.g., Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975).
See generally Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule lOb-5: Implied Remedies and Section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,

64 Va. L. Rev. 641 (1978). The Supreme Court has

acknowledged a private right of action for damages under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and under rule lob-5. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-51 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 13 n.9 (1971). It has yet to consider whether a private action is implied in § 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933.

105. Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237, 239(9th Cir. 1978) (adopting rationale of Fifth
and Second Circuits and allowing private right of action for both injunctive relief and damages), aff'd
in part, rev'd inpartsub nom. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S, CL 242 (1979);
Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying Cort factors
with "gloss of Piper"), vacated, 100 S. CL 442 (1979); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862,
878 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).

106. 100 S. Ct. at 249.
107. Id. at 245, 247; see notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
108. 100 S. CL at 245-47; see notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
109. 100 S. Ct. at 245, 248-49; see notes 76-90 supra and accompanying text.
110. See 100 S. CL at 250-51 (White, J., dissenting). See generally PrivateActions, supra note
104, at 314-24 (Cort factors found to support a private action under § 206); 30 Vand. L. Rev. 905,
917-21 (1977) (criticizing Second Circuit's use of the Cort factors as applied to § 206; full Cort analysis
indicates that such an action should be denied).
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Ignoring the Cort factors, IIIthe Lewis majority began its inquiry into section
206 with a reiteration of the Amtrak rationale that express statutory enforcement
provisions ordinarily preclude the inference of additional remedies.11 2 The

Court found this theory relevant in light of the enforcement authority expressly
13
granted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the Advisers Act

and the Court's finding of "circumstantial" evidence of legislative intent to
provide no private remedy other than the one that flowed from section 215 of the
act. 114 The Court found persuasive two pieces of circumstantial evidence arising
out of a comparison of the statutory scheme of the Advisers Act with that of other
securities statutes. The first significant difference is the absence of express
authorization for private damage suits in the Advisers Act;'1 5 certain sections of

the other major securities acts allow private damage suits in prescribed circumstances. 116 The Court found the absence of express provisions in the Advisers
Act indicative of Congress' unwillingness to extend a damage remedy to a private

litigant. 117
The Supreme Court also used the omission of the phrase "actions at law" from
the jurisdictional section of the Advisers Act to support its conclusion. " 8 This
omission was said to stand in sharp contrast to the jurisdictional language found
in the other securities acts, 119 which provide for federal court jurisdiction over
"all suits in equity and actions at law. "120 Although this discrepancy was not
determinative, 1 2 it was sufficient, taken with the absence of any express civil
111. Although the Lewis majority indirectly covered th a second and third factors of Cori, see 100
S. Ct. at 245-48; note 18 supra and accompanying text, its less structured inquiry merely glossed
over the first factor and did not consider the final factor at all. The Court discussed the purpose of the
Advisers Act and of § 206, but failed to consider whether a private action was necessary to effectuate
that purpose. 100 S. Ct. at 249. The Lewis dissent, however, adhered to a "full" Cort analysis.
Id. at 250-51 (White, J., dissenting) (Cort is the "preferred approach").
112. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
113. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 209, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1976), authorizes the SEC
to bring suit to enjoin acts and practices in violation of the Advisers Act and to enforce its provisions
or that of any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder.
114. 100 S. Ct. at 247.
115. Id. at 247-48.
116. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11(a), 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 771 (1976); Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, § 323(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§§ 9(e), 16(b), 18(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r(a) (1976); Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, §§ 16(a), 17(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79p(a), 79q(b) (1976); Investment Company Act of
1940, §§ 30(f), 36(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-29(f), 80a-35(b) (1976).
117. 100 S. Ct. at 248; accord, Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 881-82 (2d Cir. 1977)
(Gurfein, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
118. 100 S. Ct. at 248. Section 214 of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976), provides for
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction of "all suits in equity to enjoin any violation" of the Advisers
Act or rules promulgated thereunder. Id. (emphasis added).
119. See 100 S. Ct. at 248.
120. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1976) (emphasis added); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (emphasis added); Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, § 25, 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1976) (emphasis added); Investment Company Act of
1940, § 44, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1976) (emphasis added).
121. 100 S. Ct. at 248. Although the Court established in Redington that the jurisdictional
section of an act creates no private right of action by its own effect, see 99 S.Ct. at 2490, the Lewis
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remedies, to persuade the Court that "Congress did not intend to22authorize a
cause of action for anything beyond limited equitable relief."'
Finding no implied damage action in section 206, the court turned its attention
to section 215 of the Advisers Act. Section 215, similar to "void contract"
provisions found in other securities laws, 123 provides that a contract made in
violation of the act is voidable at the option of the deceived party. 124 The Lewis
majority held that section 215 evidenced a congressional intent to allow private
parties recourse to "the customary legal incidents of voidness ... including the
availability of a suit for rescission or for an injunction against continued operation of the contract, and for restitution."1 2s Because of its refusal to infer a
private damage action under section 206, the Court strictly limited the remedy
available under section 215 to restitution of consideration. 126 Efforts to recover
any diminution of plaintiff's investment as a result of his adviser's misconduct on
that such a recovery
a restitutionary theory were precluded on the principle
1 27
would be the equivalent of a damage award.
Relying on Redington, the Lewis Court did not examine the need for a private
damage remedy under section 206 to effectuate the purposes of the Advisers
Act. 128 The use of theRedingtonprecedent is puzzling, however, because section
206 expressly prohibits specified conduct. 129 Furthermore, as the Court conceded, section 206 was intended to protect the victims of the fraudulent practices
of investment advisers. 130 Had the Redington opinion been applied accuCourt validly used § 214 of the Advisers Act to highlight the differences between it and other
securities statutes. But see 100 S. Ct. at 253-54 (White, J., dissenting).
122. 100 S. CL at 248 (footnote omitted).
123. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 29, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1976); Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, § 26, 15 U.S.C. § 79z (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 47, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-46 (1976). See generally I A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 24, § 2.4(lltb).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976); cf. ills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386-88
(1970) (under § 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976), a "void
contract" is not a nullity, merely voidable at the option of innocent party).
125. 100 S. Ct. at 247 (footnote omitted). The "void contract" provision of the Exchange Act
has frequently been cited as support for the inference of a private right of action under § 10(b) of
that act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), promulgated
thereunder. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 735 (1975); Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See generally I A. Bromberg &
L. Lowenfels, supra note 24, § 2.4(I)(b); 3 L. Loss, supra note 101, at 1757-59. The void contract
provision of the Advisers. Act was applied in a similar manner in Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568
F.2d 862, 874 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978), to support an implied action
under § 206. Lewis, however, utilized the void contract provision of the Advisers Act in a
different manner. Section 215 was seen not as supporting a private right of action under another
section of the Advisers Act, but as giving rise itself to a private action. See 100 S. CL at 246-47.
126. 100 S. CL at 249 n.14.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 249.
129. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
130. 100 S. CL at 249; see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). The benefited class would seem to
include clients and prospective clients of investment advisers. See id.; Private Actions, supra note
104, at 314-16. To avoid an expansion of liability inconsistent with legislative objectives,
however, the term "prospective clients" should be read to encompass only those prospective
clients who actually enter into an investment advisory contract. Id. at 355-56.
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rately, the minimum requirement established therein should have mandated a
more detailed examination of section 206131 that might have strengthened the
Court's conclusions 132 and brought some consistency to implication analysis.
D. Summa,'y
The dissenting Justices in Lewis strongly criticized the majority opinion's
33
analytical approach to the implication issue and its resulting inconsistencies. 1
The confusion in Lewis, however, stemmed from the insufficient direction
provided by Redington and Cannon.134 A new method of analysis, one more
finely attuned to the intricacies of securities law and its development, could
have been used to clarify rather than to obscure the Lewis implication issue. In
any event, the amorphous nature of the Cort factors and the Court's inconsistent application of them has clearly diminished their utility in implication
analysis.
II. A PROPOSED APPROACH FOR IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION
In the five years since Cort v. Ash, federal courts have grappled with its four
factor method, making the virtues and drawbacks of those criteria increasingly
apparent. 135 Although it is evident that Cort was intended to be a starting point
131. Further examination of that section might have included an investigation into the purposes
of the Advisers Act, its legislative history and a review of implied actions under other securities
antifraud provisions. 100 S. Ct. at 250 (White, J., dissenting); see note 104 supra and accompanying
text.
132. Cf. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 879-85 (2d Cir. 1977) (Gurfein, J., dissenting)
(detailed examination of § 206 and the Advisers Act indicates that implied action should be denied),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); 30 Vand. L. Rev. 905, 918 (1977) (correct application of Cort factors
warrants denial of private cause of action under § 206). But see PrivateActions, supra note 104, at
314 (Cort factors strongly suggest that private action should be allowed).
133. See 100 S. Ct. at 250 (White, J., dissenting).
134. Much of the analytical confusion emanating from Lewis seems to surround the third Cor
factor, "consistency of legislative scheme." Professor Steinberg views the factor as being capable of
two interpretations. First, that the implied action must be consistent with legislative purpose, or
second, that such action be necessary to effectuate congressional purposes, the latter being the more
restrictive interpretation. Steinberg, supra note 32, at 49. The necessity argument as applied In
Borak and Piper, however, should be viewed as separate and distinct from the third Cori factor. See
note 89 supra and accompanying text. Both Lewis and Redinglon analyze the statutes at issue In
terms of consistency with their legislative scheme. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 247-49 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2487-90
(1979); notes 78-80, 114-26 supra and accompanying text. The majority in Lewis based its argument
on two pieces of evidence drawn from an examination of the scheme of the Advisers Act. See notes
114-21 supra and accompanying text. Lewis illustrates that a stricter implication test of the type
advocated by Prof. Steinberg, see note 97 supra, is not the solution to the confusion surrounding
implied action analysis. Although the test proposed by Prof. Steinberg eliminates the balancing
problems of the Cort guidelines, as does Justice Powell's test in Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 749 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); see notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text, it
is also unduly restrictive. While a minimum requirement may be needed to bring some structure
to the implication doctrine, the development of hard and fast rules to fit a variable and often
complex issue only exacerbates the current problem surrounding implied action analysis. See
notes 137-38 infra and accompanying text.
135. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
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for the development of an integrated approach to implied actions, 136 the Court's
recent decisions are indicative of its continuing failure to develop such an
approach from Cort, its predecessors or its progeny. Because of the natural
differences among statutes, the development of universal implication criteria has
proved impractical. 137 Thus, a new conceptual approach to implication analysis
that synthesizes Cort and the more recent Supreme Court cases is warranted.
As an alternative to the universal criteria approach of Cort, specialized guidelines should be designed for implication questions arising in different areas of law
or under different types of statutes. 138 For example, there are several advantages
to a specialized approach for implied action questions that arise under the federal
securities laws. The principal statutes that regulate securities transactions and
related financial institutions 139 are linked by the common goals of disclosure
and the protection of investors from fraud.1 40 The acts are also similar in
structure, language, and SEC administration. 14 1 A uniform approach to
implied actions under securities statutes would not only clarify the analysis of
securities provisions, but would lead to more consistent and predictable
results. 142
136. See Emerging Standards,supra note 7, at 321.
137. See Pillai, supra note 1, at 41; cf. Frankfurter, supra note 60, at 543-44 (informal, less
structured approach to statutory construction advocated).
138. Professor Pillai suggests a legislative solution to the implication analysis problem, recommending that a general private right of action should be enacted to enable "individuallsl to claim
damages for injuries] sustained from violations of federal statutes by anyone other than the federal
government" Pillai, supra note 1, at 39.
139. The approach suggested in this Note might be applied to the following federal securities
laws: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa(1976); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§
77aaa-77bbbb (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-1 (1976); Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1976); Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to-52 (1976); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to-21
(1976). For a review of implied actions under stock exchange rules and rules promulgated by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, see Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-TheCounterSecuritiesMarkets: Implied LiabilitiesBased on NASD Rules, 51 Cornell L.Q. 633 (1966);
Note, GovernmentalAction and the NationalAssociation ofSecurities Dealers,47 Fordham L. Rev.
585, 595-97 (1979); 46 Fordham L. Rev. 367 (1977) (implied rights of action for violations of stock
exchange rules).
140. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969); SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); 3 H. Bloomenthal, supra note 20, § 1.16;see I L. Loss, supra
note 101, at 21-22, 130.
141. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 101, at 129.
142. Cf. ALI Fed. Securities Code § 101 (Proposed Official Draft 1978) (need to integrate
securities statutes). The proposed Federal Securities Code also presents a set of criteria for the
determination of private rights of action under Code provisions which do not expressly provide
therefore. Id. § 1722(a). Civil liability, considered in light of the nature of the defendant's conduct,
the degree of his culpability, plaintiff's injury and the deterrent effect of such liability, should be
judicially inferred if four criteria are met. Id. The Code requires that: (1) the implied action be
consistent with the conditions or restrictions of the express Code provisions providing for civil
liability; (2) the Code provision under which an implied action is sought is designed for the "special
benefit" of a class of persons, to which plaintiff belongs, against the harm alleged; (3) the remedy
soughtis not disproportionate to the alleged violation; and (4) in cases comparable to those provisions
of the Code which specify a maxirum measure of damages, a comparable maximum is imposed on
the implied remedy. Id. Although these rules bear some resemblance to the Cort factors, id. Note 3,
they are designed to function solely within the context of the Code. Unlike the Cort criteria, the Code
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The recent Supreme Court decisions in Cannon, Redington and Lewis, along
with the Cort factors and other implication theories, suggest that a court faced
with an implied action question should follow a two-step approach. First, a
simple minimum requirement-membership in a class benefited by the
statute-should be met before a court undertakes any detailed investigation of
legislative intent. If this minimum test is not satisfied, the court's inquiry should
end and a private right of action be denied. If, however, the statute under which
the action is asserted meets the threshold requirement, the court should proceed
to a second and more intricate analysis, designed to focus attention on four areas
chosen to further the ascertainment of congressional intent. 143 These secondary
factors-additional congressional purposes behind the statute, the legislative
scheme of the statute, inter-act relationships with other securities provisions,
and the role of administrative agencies-should be accorded more or less equal
weight. 14 4 When, however, the balancing of factors produces equally conflicting
indications of congressional intent, the Supreme Court's current conservative
stand on implication would seem to favor the disallowance of a private remedy.
The threshold requirement of the proposed approach requires that a securities
statute show, either expressly or through its legislative history, that it was
enacted for the especial benefit of a certain class of which the plaintiff is a
member. 145 Such a requirement would convert the especial benefit factor of Cort
into a prerequisite to the finding of an implied action. Two factors justify such a
conversion. First, although the proposed minimum requiremelit is narrower
requirements must be met in order for a private action to be inferred. Id. § 1722 & Note 3. By
consolidating and unscrambling the express and implied actions under the securities statutes, tile
Code eliminates the need for "guidelines" such as those in Cort. Id. §§ 1701-1728. The Code's
provision for implication rules is an affirmation of the continued need for judicial inference in order to
maintain a certain degree of flexibility in securities law. See id. at Iv. The rules themselves, however,
are designed, like the Cort criteria, to restrict the creation of implied actions. See 3A H. Bloomenthal,
supra note 20, § 9.05A. Still the subject of examination and debate, the Code is years away from
possible enactment by Congress. See Disputes on Code Rewrite May Cause SEC Setback, Nat'l
L.J., Jan. 7, 1980, at 3, col. 2; ALl Securities ProposalHits loth Year, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 5, 1979,

at 10, col. 1.
143. The availability of the particular form of relief sought by the plaintiff is pertinent to the
question of congressional intent to allow a private action and can therefore be considered
simultaneously with the implied action issue. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 243 (1979); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 4 (1977); accord,
Implying Civil Remedies, supra note 1, at 297. Contra, Davis v. Passman, 99 S. Ct. 2264, 2274
(1979).
144. In order to avoid the problems encountered by courts in evaluating the results of the
Cort analytical method, see notes 21-27 supra and accompanying text, this proposalattempts to
formulate guidelines of equal importance and consideration, based, in part, on the Court's latest
implication cases. E.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 247-49
(1979) (stressing relationships among Advisers Act's provisions); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (1979) (reducing importance of "necessity" argument).
145. The emphasis of this minimum requirement, as in Cort, is on the especial nature of the
beneficiary. Although the phrase "for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted" as used In
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916), was initially construed as applying to all
"intended" beneficiaries of a statute, see note 2 supra, Cort interpreted the phrase such that only
primary beneficiaries could be deemed "especial." Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see Pillal,
supra note 1, at 20; Emerging Standards, supra note 7, at 308-09.

1980]

IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION

than the one suggested in Redington, which would also permit inference under
statutes prohibiting specified conduct,' 46 it is consistent with the tendency of the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts to emphasize the especial benefit
criterion of Cort in their analyses.' 47 Second, this criterion can be traced not only
to the Supreme Court's earliest implication decision,' 48 but to established common law principles. 149 Although the existence, without more, of an especial
beneficiary is no longer accepted by the Supreme Court as a sufficient reason for
granting an implied action, so it should be a threshold requirement for analysis of
securities implication issues.'s'More rigorous than the test for standing,'S 2 this
requirement should effectively reduce needless securities litigation and the possibility of judicial legislation of private actions that favor persons only tangentially benefited by the statute.' 5 3
After determining that the especial benefit requirement is met, the court
should examine the first of the four secondary factors, the general congressional
146. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S.CL 2479, 2485, 2489 (1979); accord, 3A H.
Bloomenthal, supra note 20, § 9.05A, at 9-15.
147. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26-35 (1977) (legislative history
examined at length to determine if Congress intended to benefit tender offerors); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (statute adopted expressly for protection of investors, a class of
which plaintiffs were members); Stern v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 603 F.2d
1073, 1087-88 (4th Cir. 1979) (primary beneficiary test is "threshold hurdle").
148. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
149. See In re Anonymous, 87 Eng. Rep. 791, 791 (Q.B. 1703) (Holt, C.J.) ("'f]bere-ever a
statute enacts anything, or prohibits anything, for the advantage of any person, that person shall
have remedy to recover the advantage given him, or to have satisfaction for the injury done him
contrary to law by the same statute; for it would be a fine thing to make a law by which one has a
right, but no remedy but in equity."); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *123; Restatement of Torts
§ 286 (1934) (formulation of statutory tort theory); note 2 supra and accompanying text.
150. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2485 (1979); Clark v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 570 F.2d 1138, 1146 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 970 (1978).
151. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979); cf. Pillai, supra note 1,
at 20 ("The sole function of the 'especial beneficiary' factor should be to provide a basis for the
inference that Congress intended for the statute to affect the rights of the plaintiff") (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted); 3A H. Bloomenthal, supra note 20, § 9.05A (once plaintiff is
established as an "especial beneficiary," a presumption of a private remedy is created).
152. See PrivateActions, supra note 104, at 315. Standing "is a question of whether a plaintiff is
sufficiently advers[e] to a defendant to create an Article III case or controversy or at least to
overcome prudential limitations on federal court jurisdiction." Davis v. Passman, 99 S.CL 2264,
2274 n.18 (1979); cf. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-56
(1970) (three part test for standing). Because implied actions are reviewed by a court in terms of a
particular plaintiff's ability to assert a private action, implied action issues are sometimes mistakenly
framed as questions of standing. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 455-56 (1974). In Amtrak, the Court established that the issues of a
plaintiff's standing to sue and a court's jurisdiction to entertain an implied action suit should be
decided after the existence of such an action has been determined. Id. at 456. But see id. at 467
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (distinctions between "right of action," "jurisdiction" and "standing" in
Amtrak merely a matter of semantics).
153. Courts do not seem to have had any difficulty distinguishing between secondary beneficiaries and especial beneficiaries of a statute. See note 147 supra and accompanying text. But see
EmergingStandards,supra note 7, at309 (especial benefitfactor is not a viable measure of legislative
intent; it does not aid in distinguishing especial beneficiaries from secondary beneficiaries).
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purposes behind the statute in question. 154 Like the especial benefit requirement,
congressional purpose may also be discerned from statutory language and legislative history. The court should concentrate on effectuating, in the words of
Justice Frankfurter, not the purpose
which Congress should have enacted, or would have [enacted, but] ...that which it did
enact, however inaptly, because it may fairly be said to be embedded in the statute, even if

a specific manifestation was not thought of, as is often the very reason for casting a statute
in very general terms."5s
Pursuant to this inquiry, a court should consider both state common law and
statutory tradition. IS6 Although the role of state law has been a minor considation in recent implication cases, '57 it has been significant in the development of
federal corporate law and the scope of recognized implied actions. I"8
Next, a court should review the scheme and structure of the particular
securities act under analysis, examining the relationships of the various provisions of the act interse. The court should consider whether an implied action will
undermine the often delicately balanced purposes of the act or disrupt the
legislative scheme, thereby frustrating legislative intent. 15 9 Many of the acts
60
are directed at regulating a particular segment of the securities industry
and provide detailed systems of control. The court should carefully consider
whether an implied action will unduly upset this established pattern of
regulation. 161 Congressional limitations evident in the structure of the act are
an important reflection of congressional intent regarding private actions and
154.

Although one of the purposes of the act may be to benefit an individual in plaintiff's

category, it may not be the sole or primary purpose. Compare J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,

432 (1964) (one of the provision's chief purposes is the protection of investors) with Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 249 (1979) (implication should not be based on
mere fact that statute is designed to protect adviser's clients).
155. Frankfurter, supra note 60, at 539.
156. See generallyImplying CivilRemedies, supra note 1, at 292-93. But see Pillai, supra note 1,
at 33-35 (deference to state remedies in implication analysis is usually ill-advised),
157. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 249 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (1979). But see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1977) (plaintiff relegated to state law remedies for damage claim).
158. Cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74, 479-80 (1977) (plaintiff relegated
to state law remedy; only conduct involving manipulation or deception is reached by § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), or rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-S
(1979)); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964) ("overriding" federal law in Borak
controlled despite provisions of state corporation law).
159. See Network Project v. Corporation for Public Brc.adcasting, 561 F.2d 963, 972 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978) (no private cause of action under Public Broadcasting Act
of 1967, 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1976), for injunctive relief; legislative scheme, which was a result of delicate
balance of federal, state, public and private interests, would be disrupted by such an action).
160. See l L. Loss, supra note 101, at 134-43 (approach of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1976), to regulation of utility holding companies); id. at
144-53 (detailed regulatory pattern found in Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§
80a-1 to -52 (1976)).
161. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1975)
(private action would undermine policy considerations which led to creation of regulatory
organization).
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the potential expansion of a legislative scheme that invariably accompanies
62
their inference.1
The third proposed inquiry directs the court to examine the relationship
between the section under which the plaintiff seeks to infer a cause of action and
any parallel provisions in the other securities acts. Thus, the court should
examine the relevant section in the context of a body of securities law.' 63 The
nature and scope of these related private actions, whether express or implied, can
enlighten the court as to the type of private action, if any, that Congress might
have intended to include in the statute at issue. 164 For example, in its interpretation of the Investment Advisers Act in Lewis, the Court briefly noted that
through an amendment to the Investment Company Act in 1970,16 S Congress
created a very narrowly defined private action for damages in favor of
investment companies against their investment advisers. 166 Such a provision
seems to support the Lewis Court's conclusion that Congress' silence at both
the time of enactment and at the time of amendment of the Advisers Act in
1960167 indicated an unwillingness to impose broad damage liability on
investment advisers. This related provision in the Investment Company Act is

162. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2485 (1979).
163. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 101, at 139; cf. ALI Fed. Securities Code § 101 (Proposed Official
Draft 1978) (necessity for a code); 3A H. Bloomenthal, supra note 20, § 9.05A (describing general
federal securities antifraud provisions as "persuasive and overlapping.").
164. The function and operation of express private liabilities in the act and the detail with which
Congress has defined those express provisions in terms of statutes of limitations, relief available,
standing to sue, and the degree of culpability should be considered by the court. Although the
existence of express private actions should not deter judicial inference of a private action under
another section of the act, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 711 (1979), the
absence of parameters for acourt to follow in defining the implied action can work against recognition
of an implied action. See Hazen, supra note 104, at 658.
165. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1428
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1976)).
166. A security holder of a registered investment company may bring an action on behalf of that
company against its investment adviser based on breach of fiduciary duty for compensation or
payments paid by the investment company or its security holders to the investment adviser. Id.
167. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-750, § 9, 74 Stat. 887 (1960). Section 206 was amended
to give the SEC the authority to define and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent violations
of the section. Id. In 1975, an SEC proposal for amending the Advisers Act to include, inter alia, the
phrase "actions at law" in § 214 was submitted to Congress. See Proposed Amendments to the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Hearings on S. 2849 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976). The § 214
change was proposed to ensure "the right of an individual who has been injured as a result of a
violation of the Advisers Act to sue for civil damages in Federal courts." Id. at 2. But see id. at 233
(statement of Prof. Loss) (amendment to § 214 "will not assure civil liability; it will simply remove a
possible impediment"). At the time of the proposed 1976 amendment, no circuit court had yet ruled
on the § 206 implied action issue, although there was apparent confusion in the district courts on the
subject. Compare Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260, 262-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (allowing private cause of action for damages under § 206) with Greenspan v. Del
Toro, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,488 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (private cause
of action denied based on jurisdictional section). Although reported on favorably by the committee,
the bill never reached the floor of the Senate or House of Representatives. See Ahart, Suggested
Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act, 6 Sec. Reg. L.J. 226, 228 (1978).
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more pertinent and should have received greate emphasis than the "circumstantial" evidence so heavily relied on by the Lewis majority. 168
The fourth and final inquiry in this second stage of analysis centers on the role
of the SEC169 or any other established regulatory body 70 in the administration
and enforcement of the act and provision under consideration. Whether a
monitoring function is involved, as in Redington, 17 or an active enforcement
duty, as in Lewis, 172 the court should consider the effect of an implied action on
the established pattern of agency regulation. The advantages of having one
enforcer as opposed to an army of private attorneys general 173 should also be
examined. A subsequent need for additional and more effective enforcement
mechanisms beyond those provided by Congress should not necessarily be filled
by the judicial inference of a private action. Instead, the court should determine
whether the act in question possesses such a high degree of flexibility that an
increased need for regulatory control can be satisfied by allowing a private right
of action. 7 4 Finally, although the SEC's view will not be controlling in determining whether an action should be inferred in favor of a particular class, 17 the
agency will be influential when it has "rendered binding, consistent, official
interpretations of [a] statute over a long period of time."1' 76 It should be noted,
however, that SEC support for the implied actions in Lewis and Redington 177
did not persuade the Court that such actions were justified.
The implication analysis suggested by thjs Note is a reflection of the Court's
present conservative view of the practice of judicial inference as well as an
attempt at a more pragmatic approach to the analysis of implied actions. With
Cort's precedential validity thrown into question by the Court's recent decisions, a new direction for implication analysis is needed. Both the structure of
the suggested analytical method and the sharpened focus of its guidelines offer

168. See notes 115-22 supra and accompanying text.
169. See generally House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Federal Regulation and
Regulatory Reform 17-24 (Comm. Print 1976).
170. See, e.g., Commodity Exchange Act, § 101(a)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1976) (creating the
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n); Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 3(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78ccc(a) (1976) (creating the Securities Investor Protection Corp.).
171. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
172. See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
173. See Stern v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 603 F.2d 1073, 1092 (4th Cir.
1979); National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 470 F. Supp. 1256, 1260
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); cf. Caceres Agency, Inc. v. Trans World Airways, 594 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir.
1979) (statutory compliance may be more efficiently and nexpensively achieved without private
litigation).
174. 2AJ. Sutherland, supra note 22, §§ 49.01-.02. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426, 432 (1964); Clark v. Gulf Oil Corp., 570 F.2d 1138, 1148 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
970 (1978).
175. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 n.27 (1977).
176. Id.; cf. Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617, 626-27 (2d Cir. 1978) (SEC position
should be known to the court), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979). See generally 2AJ. Sutherland, supra note
22, § 49.03.

177. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 243, 248 n. 13 (1979);
Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617, 626 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979).
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the courts a more substantial basis for their examination of an implied action
issue.
CONCLUSION

The proposed approach will eliminate some of the confusion presently surrounding implied action analysis and, it is hoped, draw courts away from the
overly broad Cort criteria. When possible, a more structured and specialized
approach to implication should be taken. A return to Cort per se will not
resolve the problems presented by the Supreme Court's latest implication
cases. Although the Court's decisions interpreting a particular area of law,
such as securities, may reflect its general conservatism in that area, 178 such
conservatism need not and should not breed inconsistent analysis.
Catherine M,. Costa
178. See Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 4fter Naftalin and Redington, 68
Geo. L.J. 163, 163-64 (1979) (Supreme Court has generally restricted the scope and effect of
securities laws); accord, Lowenfels, supra note 13, at 891.

